Gender quotas aim to increase women's parliamentary representation. However, the effectiveness of quotas varies. This article explores this issue further by examining the case of Poland, where gender quotas were introduced in 2011. The Polish case presents an interesting puzzle. Although the overall number of women candidates increased almost twofold in comparison with the pre-quota period, this translated into only a slight increase in the number of women deputies in 2011 and 2015. Hence, the impact of quotas was limited. However, the partisan analysis shows that there was a significant variation among individual parties: whereas some parties promoted wholeheartedly women's access to political office, other parties did not facilitate it.
Introduction
Gender quotas aim to increase women's parliamentary representation. They have become an increasingly popular method of addressing the parliamentary underrepresentation of women. The global spread of gender quotas originated during the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women which was held in Beijing in 1995. The resulting Platform for Action advocated that governments should take action in order to ensure women's equal access to political office and decision-making (Kenny and Verge, 2016) . Consequently, the number of countries adopting gender quotas has increased over the past few years and currently some 100 countries are using gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Dahlerup, 2012) . However, the effectiveness of quotas -that is, the extent to which gender quotas enhance women's parliamentary representation -varies. For example, in the European Union, where nine countries currently use legislative gender quotas, women's representation ranges from 39% in Belgium and Spain to 22% in Ireland 1 in 2016 (IDEA, 2016 Inter-parliamentary Union, 2016) .
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This article examines the effectiveness of legislative gender quotas in Poland.
The case of Poland merits scholarly attention. It is the only country in Eastern Europe, except for the Balkan states, which uses legislative gender quotas and there is hardly any research on gender quotas in Eastern Europe. Case study research is best suited for an in-depth country-specific analysis (see Gerring, 2004 ). It will draw out the nuanced nature of gender quotas and their effects, in addition to the detailed analysis of party candidate selection methods. This research clearly shows that an in-depth case study can shed additional light on the effectiveness of gender quotas whereas, quantitative research overlooks qualitative differences. The primary data is based on a unique dataset on candidates provided by This article is an important contribution to the research on gender quotas and women's parliamentary representation for several reasons. First, there is hardly any research concerning women in parliaments in Eastern Europe and the case of Poland has not been included in major studies of gender quotas around the world. By examining the case of Poland, this article helps to explain nuances to the logic of promoting gender quotas in new democracies. Second, this article contributes to the theoretical studies by using a novel approach to analysing gender quotas. Rational choice institutionalism provides an explicit framework for studying preferences of political parties and institutional constraints. Legislative gender quotas are implemented by political parties, and hence, there is a need for party-level analysis.
This article investigates intra-party mechanisms, both formal and informal, that can explain varied effectiveness of quotas. In addition, formal institutions matter for the effectiveness of gender quotas because policy design influences women's placement on party lists, and hence, chances for being elected. Third, a public policy approach is needed in order to examine effectiveness. Policy evaluation assesses policy design and the extent of policy implementation: that is, who executed policies and how they are executed. The literature stipulates that variation in quota effectiveness is caused by inadequate implementation but this article shows that it is due to policy design.
The remainder of this article is divided into four sections. The first section presents a literature review on gender quotas. The second section puts forward the analytical framework based on rational choice institutionalism. The third section is an empirical analysis which presents a diachronic comparison of election results and women's representation in the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament, the Sejm. It is followed by a discussion focusing on policy design and the preferences of political parties. Finally, the concluding section summarises the findings.
The Literature on Gender Quotas
There is a burgeoning literature on gender quotas (e.g. Dahlerup, 2006; European Parliament, 2013; Htun, 2016; Kittilson, 2001; Krook, 2009; Praud, 2012) .
Initially, the literature focused on explaining the adoption of gender quotas but subsequently, has also addressed their implementation. The most recent developments focus on the effectiveness of gender quotas (see e.g. Franceschet et al., 2012; Paxton and Hughes, 2015; Schwindt-Bayer, 2009 ).
Before the main scholarly arguments are discussed, a definition of gender quotas should be outlined. According to Dahlerup (2006) , a legislative gender quota is 'a type of equal opportunity measure that forces the nominating bodies, in most political systems the political parties, to recruit, nominate or select more women for political positions' (Dahlerup 2006: 6) . It is a 'legal reform, which requires political parties to nominate between 25 and 50 per cent of women candidates' (Krook et al., 2009: 795 Krook (2009; , quota policies include: reserved seats, party quotas and legislative quotas. Quota policy based on reserved seats means one of the following: creating distinct electoral rolls for women; designating separate districts for them; or allocating seats for women based on each party's proportion of the vote. Party quotas are voluntary measures set out by political parties which can be applied to the electoral list as a whole, to specific seats or constituencies (Krook, 2010; Lovenduski and Norris, 2005; Campbell et al., 2006) . Finally, legislative quotas, which are enacted through reforms to electoral laws or constitutions, stipulate that women must constitute a certain percentage of candidates on all party lists.
Despite the common goal of increasing the numbers of women elected to parliaments, quotas have had varied effects on women's representation. The impact of gender quotas can be moderated by several factors. First, the type of electoral system matters (Norris, 2006) . As early as the 1950s, Duverger (1955) highlighted the role of electoral systems in determining the number of women elected to parliaments.
Majoritarian systems inhibit women's parliamentary representation. By contrast, electoral systems with party list proportional representation and large district magnitudes favour the election of women. In such systems, a woman can be placed further down on the party list and still be elected (Jones, 1998; Lijphart, 1999; Norris, 2006) . However, there is a caveat here. The literature on electoral systems points to the complexity of the relationship between preferential voting and women's representation (see Marsh, 1985) . The most recent findings demonstrate that the effects of gender quotas in open-list proportional representation systems are not as positive as those of closed-list systems (Jones and Navia, 1999; Górecki and Kukołowicz, 2014) . In an open-list system, voters may alter the order by preferring other candidates rather than women (Matland, 2006) . A closed-list system with a zipper, which means alternating men and women candidates, is regarded as the most advantageous type of electoral system for women because candidates are automatically elected in the order determined by the party (Millard, 2014) .
Second, policy design can influence the implementation of gender quotas and hence their effectiveness. There are three main aspects of policy design which are examined in the literature. The first is a quota size. Quotas that require more women on party ballots lead to the election of more women (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009 ).
However, women's electoral success depends not only on the number of women but also on their place on the list. Hence, the second aspect of policy design is placement on the party list. Placement mandates are 'rules requiring that women occupy certain positions on candidate lists' (Paxton and Hughes 2015: 332) . The literature corroborates that positions higher up the ballot mean higher chances of being elected to parliament (e.g. Faas and Schoen, 2006; Marcinkiewicz, 2014; Millard, 2014) . The third aspect of policy design is sanctions for non-compliance. They are 'measures that penalise parties for failing to comply with quota provisions' (Paxton and Hughes, 2015: 332 (Matland, 1993; Kittilson, 1999; Millard, 2004; Praud, 2012 arguments that having a higher number of women in politics is normatively appropriate (Bush, 2011; Paxton and Hughes, 2015) . For example, the European Union promotes the idea of gender equality among its member states (European Parliament, 2013; MacRae, 2012) .
Finally, the role of political parties is examined in the literature. Kittilson (1999) analyses the impact of political parties by looking at party organisation, party ideology, women party activists and party quotas. Moreover, the literature points to the importance of parties as gatekeepers to political office (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Norris, 1996; Murray, 2004) . For Norris and Lovenduski (1995) , the outcome of particular parties' selection processes can be understood in terms of the interaction between the supply of candidates wishing to stand for office and the demands of party gatekeepers who select the candidates. Gender quotas, then, challenge the relationship between voters, parties and representatives by making parties revise their selection practices in terms of gender quotas (Dahlerup, 2006) .
Whilst there is a burgeoning literature on gender quotas in well-established democracies, there is scarce research on gender quotas in the new democracies of Eastern Europe, although there are a few notable exceptions. Gwiazda (2015) explains the adoption of gender quotas in Poland. Millard (2014) and Górecki and Kukołowicz (2014) examine the implementation of gender quotas for the 2011 election in Poland.
But this research pays little attention to the interaction of individual party preferences on gender equality with formal and informal institutions, which is addressed in this article, by examining two elections: in 2011 and 2015.
Moreover, although the important role of parties in shaping access to political office is widely recognised, Kenny and Verge (2016) note that there have been surprisingly few systematic studies into candidate selection and recruitment despite the fact that candidate selection is at the heart of what political parties do. Thus, this article also addresses this research gap.
The Analytical Framework
Examining effectiveness means analysing the extent to which gender quotas are successful in enhancing women's parliamentary representation. I adopt insights from the public policy literature and rational choice institutionalism in order to shed more light on the effectiveness of gender quotas.
The public policy literature specifies that policy evaluation is 'the systematic assessment of the operation and/or the outcomes of a program or policy, compared to a set of explicit or implicit standards, as a means of contributing to the improvement of the program or policy' (Weiss, 1998: 4) . Knill and Tosun (2012) raise two important questions about policy evaluation: Has the policy attained its objectives? Is the failure to meet the policy goals related to the design of public policy or its implementation by political actors? Consequently, in order to assess the effectiveness of gender quotas both formal institutions (policy design) and actions by political actors should be considered.
Rational choice institutionalism emphasises the relationship between political actors' rational action and institutional constraints (see e.g. Hall and Taylor, 1996; Shepsle and Bonchek, 1996; Tsebelis, 2002) . Hence, the analytical framework presented here is based on the combination of institutional and partisan factors. The hypotheses below integrate political parties' preferences with the institutional arrangement provided by gender quota policy. Two hypotheses will be tested. The first hypothesis refers to formal institutions whereas the second hypothesis refers to political actors, in this case, political parties.
Formal institutions mean policy design as stipulated in the gender quota law.
Formal institutions matter for the effectiveness of gender quotas because they provide the institutional context within which political parties operate with respect to candidates' recruitment and selection. According to North (1990) , 'institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction' (North 1990: 3) . Formal institutions are 'formal constraints' and 'formal rules' such as constitutions, statutes and contracts (North, 1990: 46) . Two specific formal provisions are examined here: sanctions for noncompliance and placement mandates which are shown in the literature to be vital for gender quota effectiveness.
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Hypothesis 1a: High costs of non-compliance increase the effectiveness of gender quotas. Even if there is policy incongruence, a political party will still implement the policy because of the high cost.
Hypothesis 1b: Placement mandates increase the effectiveness of gender quotas because political parties must place women in the top places, thus increasing the chances of election.
In addition, political actors are important. Political parties are in charge of gender quota implementation: if they support gender equality and gender quotas, greater quota effectiveness is expected. Gender equality provides for equal treatment and equal rights of men and women, and can be guaranteed through legal reform (Inglehart and Norris 2003) . Gender quotas provide for equal opportunity in political representation (Inglehart and Norris 2003) . Hence, political parties who favour gender equality and gender quotas will support women's representation in parliament.
Hypothesis 2: Political parties are expected to enhance women's parliamentary representation if their preferences are congruent with gender equality and gender quotas.
A scholarly reason for using the analytical framework based on rational choice institutionalism is that it provides an explicit and systematic methodology for studying preferences of political actors involved in policy implementation and the role of institutional constraints. In what follows, I will test the hypotheses in the Polish case.
The Case of Poland
Legislative gender quotas were adopted in Poland to enhance women's parliamentary representation (Gwiazda, 2015) . At the beginning of democratic transition in the early 1990s, women were underrepresented in parliament. Over time the situation slightly improved. Table 1 shows the percentage of women deputies from 1991-2015. In the first democratically elected Sejm, there were only 9.6% of women deputies, the number increasing to 13% in the subsequent elections. In 2001, there was an increase to 20% which can be explained by the use of voluntary party quotas. 5 After the 2011 election, 24% of deputies were women and after the 2015 election, 27% In addition to the total data, party-level data is vital given the fact that political parties are in charge of recruiting candidates for representatives and deciding on their placement on party lists. Table 3 
Discussion
The aforementioned analysis raises two important questions. Given legislative gender quotas, how can we explain a modest overall increase in women's parliamentary PiS also voted against the introduction of gender quotas (Sejm, 2010c) . In addition, Law and Justice leader Jarosław Kaczyński called non-winnable positions on party lists as 'women's places' (Chełstowska et al., 2015) . systematically supported women in their ranks (Chełstowska et al., 2016) . In 1991 and 1993, the percentage of women in the party in the Sejm was 2% and 6%
respectively; none in 1997 and 2001 , and 4% in 2005 (see Gwiazda, 2016 . Table 3 demonstrates that PSL had 3.2% ( (Markowski, 2016; Szczerbiak, 2016) . Kukiz'15 largely consists of conservative activists and is known for conservative attitudes towards the role of women in society (Chełstowska et al., 2016) . Kukiz'15 is dominated by conservatives and nationalists and hence there was no place for women in the top ranks (Interview 2).
The Modern party was formed in May 2015 by liberal economist Ryszard
Petru. In the October 2015 election, it won 7.6% of the vote and emerged as the fourth largest party with 24 seats. It was supported by younger, well-educated, urban and entrepreneurial voters who were attracted by economically liberal attitudes once associated with Civic Platform which somehow departed from its market-oriented policy (Markowski, 2016) . Apart from the legislative quotas, Modern further promoted women using their own, internal regulations. It had no formal rules regarding women's places on the lists. Yet it was confirmed in the interviews that Modern adopted an informal policy to promote women in the party. A female deputy from Modern confirmed that:
There was no formal party resolution. This was rather an informal agreement supported by the party leader, Ryszard Petru. There was no systematic approach to women's placement on party lists; in some cases it was about Number 1, in other cases, it was about one woman in the top three places or two women in the top five places. However, there is no denying that the Number 1 place was the most important (Interview 2).
In fact, the interviewee said that she was a candidate No. In 2011 Helmke and Levitsky, 2004 ). Yet many 'rules of the game' that structure political life are informal. According to North (1990) , informal institutions are 'informal constraints which come from socially transmitted information' (North 1990: 37) .
Informal party quotas are as important and effective as formal party quotas. Third, this research confirms that the mandate placement is an important institutional provision. The more women are in the top places, the more women are elected to parliament. Number 1 is the most important place on the list. The effectiveness of '1 in top 3' provision depends on the size of the party. For large parties, it matters; for small parties, the effect is negligible. This is because large parties can have several candidates elected, whereas small parties can hope for only one candidate being elected, who is usually Number 1 on the list. Nevertheless, the main implication is that additional provisions on placement mandates should increase the number of women elected to office. Fourth, as discussed above, policy design should be based on a combination of high penalty for non-compliance and placement mandates.
Placement mandates without any sanctions for non-compliance might be ineffective.
Conclusions
The primary objective of legislative gender quotas is to increase the number of Further research should investigate if the use of quotas is becoming more effective over time because of incumbency effects and normative changes. The political science literature shows that there is a strong incumbency effect. Incumbents have a very high probability of re-election (Erikson, 1971; Gelman and King, 1990) .
This assertion should be tested for women representatives elected to parliament.
Moreover, the literature points to the positive effects of changing norms. Over time increasing norms of equality are expected to decrease political party efforts to sidestep quota targets (Paxton and Hughes, 2015) . Thus, the time factor should be taken into consideration in the future.
To sum up, the Polish case shows strong partisan and institutional effects on women's parliamentary representation. In the case of ineffective gender quota policy, political parties decide on women's representation. Parties supporting gender equality have introduced formal and informal party quotas in order to increase the chances of women being elected to parliament. There is no denying that the support of political parties makes a difference, but institutions are equally important.
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